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Abstract: Income distribution in Spain has experienced a substantial improvement towards
equalisation during the second half of the seventies and the eighties; a period during which
most OECD countries experienced the opposite trend. In spite of the many recent papers on
the Spanish income distribution, the period covered by those stops in 1990. The aim of this
paper is to extent the analysis to 1996 employing the same methodology and the same data
set (ECPF). Our results not only corroborate the (decreasing inequality) trend found by
others during the second half of the eighties, but also suggest that this trend extends over
the first half of the nineties. We also show that our main conclusions are robust to changes
in the equivalence scale, to changes in the definition of income and to potential data
contamination. Finally, we analyse some of the causes which may be driving the overall
picture of income inequality using two decomposition techniques. From this analyses three
variables emerge as the major responsible factors for the observed improvement in the
income distribution: education, household composition and socioeconomic situation of the
household head.
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11. Introduction
Income distribution in Spain has experienced a substantial improvement towards equalisation
during the second half of the Seventies and the Eighties;2 a period during which most OECD
countries experienced the opposite trend.3
In spite of the many recent papers on the Spanish income distribution, the period covered by those
stops in 1990.4 The aim of this paper is to extent the analysis to 1996 employing the same
methodology and the same data set for the whole period. That is, we analyse in detail the changes
in the Spanish income distribution from 1985 to 1996 using the ECPF. Our results not only
corroborate the (decreasing inequality) trend found by others during the second half of the
Eighties, but also suggest that this trend extends over the first half of the Nineties.
Several factors seem to be driving this trend towards equalisation: (i) a more unequal earnings
distribution, which is the main income component;5 (ii) the redistributive rôle of the public sector;6
(iii) the substantial changes in (female) labour participation rates and unemployment rates, whose
impact on the income distribution has been relatively small;7 and (iv) demographic changes leading
to an ageing population which seems to have had a positive impact on the distribution of income.8
Even though, accounting for the observed level and change of income inequality is not the main
purpose of this paper, we complement our descriptive analysis with a study of the distribution of
income by population subgrups. From this analysis three variables emerge as the major
responsible factors for the observed improvement in the income distribution: education, household
composition and socioeconomic classification of the household head.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 addresses some limitations of our analysis and the
methodological choices we have taken to address them. Section 3 analyses the distribution of real
net equivalent income —which is our reference definition of income— for the period 1985-1996
and its evolution. Section 4 presents the main results of the decomposition analyses of the income
distribution by population subgroups. Section 5 checks the robustness of our main conclusions
                                                                
2 This is the evidence obtained from the EPF (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares, Spanish Family Expenditure Survey) or
from the ECPF (Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares, Spanish Family Expenditure Survey —interviews are held
every three months) data. However, studies based on fiscal administrative records (i.e. el panel de declarantes del IRPF) find
the opposite trend — see, Castañer, 1991; Lasheras et al., 1993; Melis and Díaz, 1933; Lambert and Ramos, 1997. See Garde
et al. (1996) for likely explanations of such difference in trends.
3 See Atkinson et al. (1995), Smeeding and Gottschalk (1995), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998), Zaidi and de Vos (1998).
4 See, however, Imedio et al . (1997) and Oliver and Raymond (1999) for a notable exception.
5 See, inter alia, Revenga (1991), Díaz and Melis (1993), and Ayala et al. (1996).
6 See Medel et al. (1988), Bandrés (1990, 1993) and Gimeno (1993).
7 See Revenga (1991) and Ayala et al. (1996) for the effect of unemployment changes on income inequality; and Alba and
Collado (1999), and Gradín and Otero (1999) for the impact of increasing female labour force participation.
8 The population share and the relative income of households headed by individulas older than 65 years of age have increased
over the period.
2from section 3. In particular, we analyse the sensitivity of our results to changes in the equivalence
scale, to changes in the definition of income and to potential data contamination, mostly at both
ends of the distribution. Finally, Section 6 provides a summary and some concluding remarks.
2. Data shortcomings and methodological choices
The data (ECPF) we use presents three major problems for distributional analyses. First, since
income and related questions refer to previous term’s, information on extra pay (e.g. Christmas
bonus) which accrue in the last quarter of the year, get reported in the first quarter interviews.
Thus, in order to obtain annual earnings we estimate it from income information provided in the
second quarter interviews.
Second, like most surveys, income and expenditure (though to a lesser extent) data are clearly
underreported when compared to National accounts figures. Differences amount to one third of the
figures given by the Spanish National accounts, and decrease over the period of study.
And third, the aggregate distribution by income source steaming from the ECPF differs
substantially from that of the National accounts. Here, the main problem arises from the systematic
misreporting of capital and self-employment incomes.9 In other words, once imputed rents are
taken out, labour income and pensions are overreported in the ECPF —on average and over the
period 1985-1996, labour income represents 57.4% of total income in the ECPF as opposed to
47.1% in the National Accounts, whereas pensions represent 21% in the ECPF and only 16% in
the National Accounts; thus an overreporting of 10 and 5 percentage points, respectively— and
capital and self-employment incomes are underreported by the same amount —capital incomes
represent 1.4% of total income in the ECPF and 7.6% in the National Accounts, whereas self-
employment income represents 14.4% in the ECPF and as much as 23.9% in the National
Accounts; that is, an underreporting of 5.5 and 9.5 percentage points, respectively.10 Given this
bias towards labour income and pensions, the main results reported in section 3 should be read
with caution.
Notwithstanding all these data problems, in section 5 we carry out several robustness analyses to
check how sensitive our results are to changes in the income definition, to changes in the
equivalence scale and to problems of data contamination. These robustness analyses clearly
                                                                
9 Notwithstanding that, Cowell, Litchfield and Mercader-Prats (1999) suggest that misreporting by the self-employed does not
change the overall distributional picture substantially. Besides the afore mentioned problems with capital and self-employment
incomes, imputed rents are also overreported in the ECPF as compared to national accounts.
10 Notwithstanding this, one has to bear in mind that, by definition, the sum of ECPF monetary and non monetary incomes does
not correspond to the disposable gross income as defined in the National accounts; the two most important factors for such a
difference being the fact that ECPF incomes are net of only tax withheld and that ECPF counts transfers amongst families as
3suggest that the conclusions obtained in section 3 using real net equivalent income are robust to
all these problems. In particular, regarding the problems pointed out above, we use a National
accounts adjusted income definition and find that results are indeed robust to these data
problems.11
Finally, real income is obtained by using a Retail Price Index for each decile and year, which we
have estimated from the expenditure structure of each decile. Income is expressed in 1985 prices.
3. Trends in the Spanish income distribution: 1985-1996
In this section we analyse the changes in the income distribution for the period 1985-1996. We use
real net equivalent income12 —the equivalence scale being that of the OECD for Spain— and a
wide range of graphical as well as analytical tools.13
To visualise the income distribution, we first use Pen’s parade (1971). To construct the parade let
the height of individuals (households) correspond to their income, order the individuals according
to their income level (height) and let them march in front of you for one hour exactly.14 Then, the
income distribution for 1996 in Figure 1, consists of a parade of dwarfs and few giants marching in
the last couple of minutes. After the first five minutes, individuals marching in front of you are only
73 cm. tall. To see the first individual who is twice as tall one has to wait another 22 minutes, and
after half an hour (median income) the height of the marcher is about a meter and a half (153 cm.).
Seven minutes later we see the individual of average height, who is 175 cm. tall. Then, one has to
wait another 20 minutes, that is, 3 to the end, to see the first individual whose height is twice the
average. Finally, the two tallest people in the 1996 ECPF data set are 13.85 and 21.52 meters tall,
respectively.
Which are the main differences between this parade and that for 1985? At first sight, one clearly
notices that the individuals marching in the 1996 parade are nearly all of them taller than those in
the 1985 one.15 That is, from 1985 to 1996, income has increased in real terms for each and every
individual. Average household income increased by 39.1% between 1985 and 1996 (from 512,512
to 712,934 pesetas), at an average annual rate of 3.1%. These results imply an unambiguous
increase in overall social welfare, according to all individualistic, symmetric, additively separable
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
part of their income —whereas in the National accounts they get cancelled out.
11 See Oliver (1997) for the methodology used in order to build such an income variable.
12 The exact definition of the real net equivalent income is provided in Appendix 1.
13 The structure of this section draws on Jenkins (1994, 1996).
14 Note that the income parade is the cumulative distribution function turned on its side.
15 Only the last 12 individuals are taller in the 1985 parade than in the 1996 one. In other words, the two lines cross at percentile
99.65. However, such a crossing may not be significant for it may be due to data contamination (Cowell y Victoria-Feser, 1998).
4and increasing social welfare functions —rank dominance condition, Saposnik, 1981.16 We can
also say that the proportion of households in poverty has fallen over time, regardless of which
common real income level is used to define the poverty line for the two distributions (Atkinson,
1987).
Figure 1. Changing income parades, 1985 and 1996
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Density functions provide another interesting picture of the income distribution, and as compared to
the income parades, they allow for a closer look at both ends of the distribution. Which is the shape
of the income distribution in 1985? As Figure 1 shows, the frequency at both ends of the estimated
distribution is low: there are relatively few households with very low and very high incomes.17 Most
households have incomes between 250,000 and one million pesetas. Notice that often relative
poverty lines are defined as half the contemporary mean or median (256,256 and 213,380 pesetas,
respectively). Hence, small changes in the low income cut-off might imply big changes in the
estimated proportion of poor. The highest frequency (mode) is at about 300,000 pesetas. The
distribution, however, does not have one peak only: at about 500,000 pesetas there is another
                                                                
16 That is, for all social welfare functions ( )å= yUW n11 , U’>0  0³"y ; where n is the number of households, y denotes income,
and U(y) is a individualistic utility function of income. Note that Saposnik’s rank dominance condition or first order stochastic
dominance does not require any assumption on the inequality aversion of the social welfare function. In other words, it does not
impose any restriction on U’’.
17 All density functions in the paper are estimated using a Gaussian kernel and a window width of 10,000 pesetas, unless
otherwise specified. Adaptative kernels would, no doubt, improve estimation at low frequency income levels.
5great concentration of households, though with less frequency. According to this picture, then, the
density does not look like being unimodal but rather bimodal.18 Notwithstanding this, such a
bimodal frequency distribution might be due to sampling problems: a kernel density with a wider
(optimal) window width shows a unimodal distribution function —see Figure 2, panel (b). Finally,
the mountain side is steeper and smoother to the left than to the right, and indeed, there is a
distinct plateau at around 900,000 pesetas.
How has the shape of the income distribution changed after more than a decade?19 When
comparing the densities in Figure 2 panel (a), two clear changes stand out: (i) the whole density
has shift rightwards, and (ii) the peaks are not as high as in 1985, and now they have the same
height. The shift of the distribution to the right corroborates the universal income increase for all
households (percentiles). However, the shape has clearly changed. We still have a bimodal
distribution —with modes at 475,000 and 600,000 pesetas— but the modes are lower. This fall in
income concentration has a negative effect on inequality, which is counterbalanced by the
frequency gain in the middle part of the distribution (between 500,000 and 1 million pesetas). As a
result, income inequality falls between 1985 and 1996.
                                                                
18 Such great concentration of incomes at various points of the distribution may suggest a certain degree of polarization. See
Esteban and Ray (1994) or Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1997) for a theoretical study on polarization; and Gradín (1997) for an
empirical analysis of polarization in Spain.
19 A graphical description of year to year changes are available from the authors on request.
6Figure 2. Density function of real net equivalent income in Spain, 1985 and 1996
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7Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide additional elements of analysis that corroborate the falling inequality
conclusion. Firstly, income as percentage of the median increases for the poorer half of the
distribution and decreases for the richer half of the distribution —see Table 1. As the last column
shows, the first nine vingtiles (those below the median income) experienced a positive, though
monotonically decreasing, change in their relative position, whereas the relative distance of the
richest nine vingtiles became smaller over these twelve years.
Table 1. Income distribution evolution in Spain. 1985-1996 (I)
Median income = 100 and change 1985-1996 in percentage
Percentile 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Change 85/96
5 34 37 41 41 45 45 43 45 43 43 41 41 18,4
10 47 50 52 51 54 53 54 55 54 54 52 52 10,3
15 57 58 60 59 62 60 61 62 62 62 60 60 5,4
20 64 64 66 64 68 67 67 67 67 68 66 66 3,1
25 70 70 71 72 73 72 73 73 73 73 73 72 3,6
30 75 76 77 78 78 77 78 78 79 79 79 78 3,6
35 81 82 83 84 83 83 84 83 84 84 84 84 2,6
40 88 88 89 89 89 90 89 89 89 89 89 89 1,4
45 94 93 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 95 95 95 0,8
50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0,0
55 108 106 107 106 106 106 107 105 105 106 106 106 -1,2
60 116 113 113 113 113 112 113 111 113 113 113 114 -1,9
65 124 120 121 120 121 119 121 118 120 121 120 120 -3,2
70 134 129 131 127 129 127 129 126 129 129 129 129 -3,6
75 145 142 140 138 138 137 140 136 140 139 139 139 -4,4
80 161 155 152 151 150 150 153 149 154 152 151 152 -5,6
85 178 174 169 166 166 166 171 165 169 169 167 169 -5,3
90 208 203 194 189 190 189 197 190 195 193 194 190 -8,7
95 261 253 236 228 236 237 241 231 248 239 239 235 -9,9
Average 120 116 116 114 116 116 116 114 116 116 116 115 -4,6
Secondly, annualised income growth rates decrease monotonically with respect to the income
vingtile, so that for the period 1985-1996 the income of the poorest vingtile grows twice as much as
that of the penultimate vingtile, and only the last four vingtiles experience growth rates below the
average income’s —see Table 2.
Finally, Table 3 shows income shares and cumulative income shares for vingtiles of the population.
The comparison between 1985 and 1996 figures clearly reveals the income distribution
improvement over this period. The income share of the poorest fifth of the population grew nearly
two percentage points, whereas the income share held by the richest fourth fell three percentage
points. This improvement is best seen by means of the Lorenz curves in Figure 3. The 1985
distribution Lorenz dominates the 1996 distribution. This result corroborates the rank dominance
shown by the income parades in Figure 1 and provides us with a powerful conclusion: according to
all standard inequality indices,20 income inequality unambiguously decreased between 1985 and
1996.
                                                                
20 That is, for all symmetric and scale invariant indices satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. See Lambert (1993),
section 5.3 for a definition of those properties.
8Table 2. Income distribution evolution in Spain, 1985-1996 (II)
Cumulative annualised income growth rates and total growth, in percentage.
Annual Annualised Total
percentile 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 85/96 85/96
5 10,5 15,1 9,0 14,6 5,8 -1,6 12,5 -4,8 -1,1 -1,5 0,0 5,1 72,7
10 8,4 10,2 5,8 10,3 4,4 4,3 9,4 -1,8 -1,9 -0,4 1,1 4,4 60,9
15 4,5 9,7 5,1 9,5 4,1 4,5 7,1 0,3 -0,3 -1,0 1,0 4,0 53,7
20 2,5 7,1 6,2 9,5 4,9 4,0 6,0 0,8 -0,3 -0,2 1,7 3,8 50,5
25 3,3 6,4 8,3 6,1 5,7 4,2 5,5 1,0 -1,2 2,7 0,5 3,8 51,1
30 3,6 7,1 8,4 5,2 5,1 4,3 6,0 1,5 -1,5 2,5 0,2 3,8 51,1
35 2,9 6,5 9,0 3,8 6,7 3,8 5,0 1,5 -1,2 2,3 1,2 3,7 49,6
40 3,1 5,7 7,8 4,7 7,5 1,9 6,2 0,5 -0,5 1,7 1,4 3,6 47,9
45 2,1 5,8 7,7 4,7 6,4 3,2 5,2 0,8 0,1 1,9 1,6 3,6 47,0
50 2,7 4,8 8,1 4,2 6,6 3,1 6,1 0,4 -0,8 2,1 1,6 3,5 45,9
55 1,1 5,5 8,0 4,1 6,5 3,9 4,3 0,2 -0,4 2,4 1,9 3,4 44,1
60 -0,2 5,0 7,8 4,6 5,8 3,9 3,8 2,1 -0,7 2,2 2,4 3,3 43,1
65 -0,5 5,6 7,7 4,7 4,7 5,3 3,1 1,9 0,1 1,8 1,0 3,2 41,1
70 -0,5 6,0 5,2 5,3 5,0 4,7 4,0 2,7 -0,6 1,8 1,4 3,1 40,6
75 0,3 3,8 6,0 4,5 5,8 5,3 3,3 2,9 -1,1 2,2 1,0 3,1 39,5
80 -0,8 2,9 6,8 4,1 6,1 5,3 3,1 4,1 -2,1 1,2 2,1 3,0 37,7
85 0,3 1,7 5,9 4,2 6,7 6,1 2,1 3,0 -0,6 1,0 2,6 3,0 38,1
90 -0,3 0,6 5,2 4,5 6,0 7,6 2,6 3,1 -2,3 2,7 -0,1 2,6 33,2
95 -0,4 -2,0 4,0 8,3 7,0 4,8 1,5 8,0 -4,6 2,3 -0,4 2,5 31,5
Media -0,8 4,6 6,3 6,5 5,9 3,8 4,1 2,1 -0,7 1,7 0,4 3,0 39,1
Note: The annualise income growth rate is [(Y1/Y0)(1/n)]-1.
Table 3. Income distribution evolution in Spain, 1985-1996 (III): income shares and cumulative income shares
for vingtiles, 1985-1996
Percentage of real net equivalent income
Perc. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Income share
5 0,8 1,3 1,1 1,3 1,0 1,0 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,1 1,1 1,3
10 1,7 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,8 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,8 1,9 1,9 2,0
15 2,0 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3
20 2,4 2,4 2,6 2,7 2,7 2,6 2,6 2,7 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,7
25 2,7 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,0 3,0 2,9 3,0 2,9 2,9 2,9 3,0
30 3,0 3,0 3,2 3,3 3,3 3,3 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2
35 3,3 3,4 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5
40 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,8 3,8 3,8 3,8 3,8 3,8 3,8 3,8 3,8
45 3,8 3,9 4,0 4,0 4,1 4,1 4,0 4,1 4,0 4,0 4,1 4,1
50 4,2 4,2 4,3 4,3 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,3 4,4 4,3 4,3
55 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,6 4,7 4,7 4,6 4,7 4,7 4,6 4,7 4,6
60 4,8 4,9 4,9 4,8 4,9 5,0 4,9 5,0 5,0 4,9 4,9 4,9
65 5,1 5,2 5,2 5,2 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,2
70 5,6 5,5 5,6 5,5 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,6 5,5
75 6,0 6,0 6,0 5,9 6,1 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,0
80 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,4 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,4
85 7,2 7,1 7,0 6,9 7,1 7,1 7,0 7,0 7,1 7,1 7,0 7,0
90 8,1 7,9 7,9 7,8 7,9 7,9 7,8 7,8 7,8 7,8 7,7 7,8
95 9,4 9,2 9,1 9,1 9,1 9,1 9,0 9,0 9,0 8,9 9,1 9,0
100 15,3 14,4 13,7 13,6 12,9 13,0 13,4 12,6 13,1 13,3 13,4 13,5
Cumulative income share
5 0,8 1,3 1,1 1,3 1,0 1,0 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,1 1,1 1,3
10 2,5 3,1 3,0 3,2 2,8 2,8 3,1 3,2 3,2 3,0 3,0 3,3
15 4,5 5,4 5,3 5,5 5,1 5,1 5,4 5,6 5,5 5,3 5,3 5,6
20 6,9 7,8 8,0 8,2 7,8 7,7 8,0 8,3 8,1 8,0 7,9 8,4
25 9,6 10,6 10,9 11,2 10,8 10,7 10,9 11,3 11,0 10,9 10,9 11,3
30 12,6 13,6 14,1 14,5 14,1 14,0 14,1 14,5 14,2 14,1 14,1 14,6
35 15,9 17,0 17,6 18,0 17,6 17,5 17,6 18,1 17,7 17,6 17,6 18,1
40 19,4 20,7 21,3 21,8 21,4 21,4 21,4 21,9 21,5 21,4 21,4 21,8
45 23,3 24,6 25,3 25,8 25,6 25,5 25,4 26,1 25,5 25,5 25,5 25,9
50 27,4 28,8 29,6 30,1 29,9 29,9 29,7 30,5 29,8 29,8 29,8 30,2
55 31,9 33,3 34,1 34,8 34,6 34,6 34,4 35,2 34,5 34,5 34,5 34,8
60 36,7 38,2 39,1 39,6 39,5 39,6 39,3 40,2 39,5 39,4 39,4 39,7
65 41,8 43,4 44,3 44,8 44,8 44,8 44,6 45,5 44,8 44,7 44,7 44,9
70 47,4 49,0 49,8 50,3 50,5 50,5 50,2 51,1 50,5 50,4 50,3 50,4
75 53,4 54,9 55,8 56,3 56,5 56,5 56,2 57,2 56,5 56,4 56,3 56,4
80 59,9 61,4 62,3 62,6 63,0 62,9 62,8 63,7 63,1 62,9 62,8 62,8
85 67,2 68,5 69,3 69,5 70,2 70,0 69,8 70,7 70,1 70,0 69,8 69,7
90 75,3 76,4 77,2 77,3 78,1 77,9 77,6 78,5 77,9 77,8 77,5 77,5
95 84,7 85,6 86,3 86,4 87,1 87,0 86,6 87,4 86,9 86,7 86,6 86,5
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
9Figure 3. Lorenz Curves of Income in Spain, 1985 and 1996
P
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f t
ot
al
 in
co
m
e
Proportion of population
0 .25 .5 .75 1
0
.25
.5
.75
1
As it is well known, all the information analysed so far can be summarised into an inequality index.
In particular, we use three members of the generalised entropy Family of indices (I0, I1 and I2), two
members of the Atkinson family of indices (A0.5 and A1), and the Gini coefficient.21
The generalised entropy class of inequality indices is given by:
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where parameter c denotes the sensitivity of the index to income differences in different parts of
the distribution, i = 1, …, n is the unit of analysis (household), y is income, and m is mean income.
I0 corresponds to the mean log deviation (MLD); I1 corresponds to one of the indices proposed by
Theil (1967); and Ic with sensitivity parameter c=2 corresponds to half the coefficient of variation
squared. The bigger the sensitivity parameter c, the more sensitive Ic is to income differences at
the top of the distribution.
                                                                
21 For a detailed analysis of these and other inequality indices see, inter alia, Atkinson (1970), Cowell (1980, 1995, 1998),
19851996
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The Atkinson class of inequality indices (Ie) contains a family of indices which are also identified by
a sensitivity parameter, e; and it is given by:
[2]
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where yd is the equally distributed equivalent income:
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Note that, in this case, the bigger the sensitivity parameter e, the more sensitive Ie is to differences
at the bottom end of the distribution. Moreover, notice that the generalised entropy class of
inequality indices in [1] includes monotonic transformations of the entire Atkinson class of
inequality indices (Shorrocks, 1980: 622). Finally, the Gini coefficient can be written as:
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m22
where subscripts i y j denote two sample units.
What do all these inequality indices show for the period 1985-1996? Broadly speaking, the
evolution of income inequality is independent of the inequality index used —see Table 4 and
Figure 4. Between 1985 and 1996, all indices decreased over 25%, except the Gini coefficient,
which fell 12.7%.
Our results are in line with the empirical literature for Spain that uses the family expenditure
surveys (encuestas de presupuestos).22 However, our estimates show a higher inequality level and
a greater decrease than most studies. Such differences could be due to differences in the definition
of income and in the equivalence scale.
From a comparative perspective, it is worth noticing that, although Spanish income inequality was
one of the highest among OECD countries at the beginning of the sample period, during the
sample period it has experienced one of the most substantial reductions of all OECD countries.23
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Jenkins (1991), Lambert (1996) or Shorrocks (1980).
22 See, inter alia, Alcaide (1989, 1991); Escribano (1990); Revenga (1991); Gimeno (1993); Ayala, Martínez and Ruiz-Huerta
(1996); Imedio, Parrado and Sarrión (1997); Cowell, Litchfield and Mercader-Prats (1999); Goërlich and Mas (1999).
23 See Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) for a comparison of nineteen OECD countries in the Eighties using LIS data.
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Table 4. Inequality indices and Abbreviated Social Welfare measures, 1985-1996
Index 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Inequality
I0 0,202 0,178 0,165 0,162 0,154 0,153 0,156 0,148 0,150 0,156 0,148 0,148
(0,010) (0,009) (0,009) (0,009) (0,010) (0,011) (0,007) (0,009) (0,007) (0,009) (0,006) (0,007)
I1 0,207 0,164 0,160 0,148 0,161 0,167 0,152 0,139 0,145 0,156 0,156 0,145
(0,018) (0,006) (0,010) (0,006) (0,017) (0,023) (0,007) (0,007) (0,005) (0,012) (0,011) (0,008)
I2 0,350 0,198 0,219 0,182 0,267 0,324 0,195 0,175 0,173 0,229 0,221 0,185
(0,088) (0,012) (0,033) (0,013) (0,081) (0,135) (0,016) (0,016) (0,008) (0,045) (0,038) (0,022)
Gini 0,331 0,309 0,298 0,291 0,291 0,293 0,294 0,282 0,291 0,292 0,293 0,289
(0,007) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,007) (0,008) (0,005) (0,005) (0,004) (0,006) (0,006) (0,005)
A0.5 0,094 0,080 0,075 0,071 0,073 0,074 0,072 0,066 0,069 0,073 0,072 0,069
A1 0,183 0,163 0,152 0,150 0,143 0,142 0,145 0,138 0,140 0,144 0,138 0,137
p90/p10 4,422 4,069 3,714 3,694 3,500 3,552 3,666 3,439 3,608 3,594 3,705 3,660
Abbreviated Social Welfare
W0.5 1,363 1,368 1,402 1,449 1,494 1,536 1,567 1,604 1,618 1,609 1,623 1,629
W1 12.945 12.960 13.019 13.083 13.154 13.212 13.246 13.294 13.313 13.300 13.325 13.330
Sen 342,750 351,325 373,381 400,799 426,630 450,933 467,232 494,649 498,937 493,928 501,809 506,929
Note: inequality measures are defined in the main text. Abbreviated Social Welfare measures are defined in footnote 24. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Figure 4. Income inequality measures, 1985-1996
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To what extent our income inequality estimates do faithfully reflect the true population trend in
income inequality? As it is common wisdom, sampling variation  in the survey being used might
lead to important differences between the true population inequality measures and those estimated
from the sample. In order to test the statistical significance of our inequality estimates, in Table 4,
we include standard errors for most measures. The confidence intervals calculated from these
standard errors are small enough to allow us to be confident not only that the fall was statistically
significant, but also that we have a reasonable estimate of the scale of inequality growth over the
period.
Finally, defining social welfare as an increasing function of per capita income and decreasing in
inequality,24 the bottom panel in Table 5 shows a clear improvement for all years except for 1994,
where per capita income fell and inequality increased. In other words, in terms of social welfare,
the few yearly increases in income inequality during the period were counterbalanced by the
growth in per capita income.
4. Income inequality by population subgroups
In this section we analyse some of the causes which may be driving the overall picture of income
inequality trends obtained in the previous section. Given the limitations imposed by the information
provided in the ECPF data sets, we use breakdowns by education, sex, age, socioeconomic
classification and household composition and size. Personal characteristics refer to the household
                                                                
24 We use abbreviated social welfare functions to measure social welfare. In particular, the three functions we use employ A0.5,
A1, and the Gini coefficient as inequality measures. Thus, We = yd(1-e)/(1-e), e>0, e¹1; We = log(yd), e=1; Sen = m·(1-Gini ). see
Lambert (1993) for a detailed analysis on abbreviated social welfare functions.
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head.
To account for income inequality and inequality trends we use three different additive
decomposition techniques and the inequality measure I0.25 The first one is the well known
decomposition by population subgroups put forward by Cowell (1980) and Shorrocks (1980). This
decomposition will enable us to account for the effect on inequality levels of each characteristic
separately —i.e. not taking into account the effect that other attributes also have on inequality.
Let us consider a population of n income units yi (i.e. individuals or households) with mean income
m and variance s2. Partition the population into k mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of
subgroups —e.g. by household composition, age of the household head, educational attainment,
etc.— comprising nk members each and mean income mk.
Then, I0 can be decomposed into two contributions. The first one —second term in [5]—
corresponds to the between groups component and measures the inequality which would obtain
had every individual had the mean income of the subgroup she belongs to. The second
contribution —first term in [5]— is the within group component and measures a weighted average
of subgroup inequalities.
[5] ( )
kk kkk k
II lnn
1
00 logåå +=
In [5], nk(ºnk/n) is the population share of group k and lk(ºmk/m) denotes the mean income of group
k relative to population (or rather sample) mean income.
In order to account for inequality change we use Jenkins’ (1995) methodology. The change in I0
can be expressed as:
[6] ( )[ ] ( ) »D-D-D+D=-=D åååå+ kk kk kkk kkkk ktt IIIII lnnlnn loglog00,01,00
       ( )[ ] ( ) ( )kk kkk kkkk kkkk k II mnqnllnn loglog00 åååå D-+D-+D+D»
[T1] [T2] [T3] [T4]
where qk (ºnk lk) is subgroup k’s share of total population income, subscript t denotes the period, D
is the difference operator and a bar over variables denotes the average of that variable over the
two periods. As Jenkins (1995) argues “the approximation is more useful than the exact
decomposition because it relates inequality changes to changes in sub-group inequalities, shares
and means” (p. 38). For clarity’s sake, instead of using the decomposition in [6], we use
proportionate changes (%DI0 = DI0/I0,t), and reinterpret terms T1 to T4 accordingly.
                                                                
25 Note that we could have used any of the generalized entropy family measures to do the decomposition analyses. We choose I0 for its
good and convenient decomposition properties. In particular, I0 is the only measure of the generalised entropy class whose
decomposition weights are a sole function of population shares. That is, weights do not depend on subgroup incomes—see Shorrocks,
1980.
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Therefore, overall inequality changes can be decomposed into changes in sub-group inequalities
[T1], changes resulting from changes in subgroup’s population weights [T2 and T3], and changes
resulting form changes in subgroup’s relative incomes [T4].
As we pointed out above, when estimating the impact of a given attribute on inequality level or its
change, these two decompositions only consider the effect of every attribute separately. In order to
estimate the joint effect of all relevant characteristics available in the ECPF, we use a different
decomposition suggested by Fields (1998).
Fields (1998) considers a log-linear income generating function
[7] ( ) eb +==Y å j jjXyln
where Xj are individual or household characteristics, bj are the corresponding OLS coefficients, and
e  is the regression residual.
If [7] is a good representation of the income generating process, the contribution sj of each
characteristic j can be expressed as:
[8]
[ ]
2
,cov
Y
Y
=
s
b jj
j
X
s
where the numerator is the covariance between bjXj and Y, and the denominator is the variance of
log-income, s2Y.
Note that this is an exact and additive decomposition.
[9] å =j j Rs 2
[10]
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Hence, each factor’s contribution to the explanatory capacity of the model can be defined as,
[11]
2R
s j
j =h
Fields (1998) shows that the decomposition in [10] holds for a wide class of inequality measures,
including the Atkinson class, Ae, the generalised entropy class, Ic, and the Gini coefficient. In
particular, [10] holds for any continuous and symmetric inequality measure I(Y1, …, YN), for which
I(m, …, m)=0.
In sum, as long as we agree on the income generating process in [7], Fields’ methodology allows
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us to decompose overall income inequality by socioeconomic characteristics of the population
without having to agree on a particular inequality measure. In other words, the effect of each
characteristic on overall income inequality is independent on the inequality measure used in the
empirical analysis.
To estimate the contribution of characteristic j to the change in inequality, however, we do have to
opt for a particular measure for the decomposition of inequality changes is not index independent.
Using I0, the contribution to the change in income inequality of characteristic j, can be expressed
as
[12]
[ ]
tt
ttjttj
j II
IsIs
,01,0
,0,1,01,
-
-
=P
+
++
where sj,t denotes the contribution to level inequality of characteristic j in period t, I0,t is the
inequality in period t, and
[13] 1=På j j .
Therefore, as in [6], the decomposition in [12] allow us to estimate the contribution of characteristic
j to the change in income inequality. Unlike [6], though, contribution Pj is net of the effect of the
other characteristic included in the model on the change in income inequality.
Obviously, changes in income inequality are due either to changes in the characteristics or to
changes in the part of income that the income generating process in [7] cannot explain —the
regression residuals. Notwithstanding this, it would be of interest to know whether changes in the
characteristics result from changes in the coefficients, from changes in the distribution of the
variable, from changes in the covariance or correlation between the characteristics and income, or
from mere changes in income inequality.
Now, note that contribution sj can also be written as
[8’]
[ ]
Y
Y××
=
s
sb ,jXj
j
Xcorr
s j
where sXj is the standard deviation of characteristic j, corr[Xj, Y] is the correlation between Xj and
Y, and sY is the standard deviation of Y.
For infinitesimal changes, an exact decomposition of the difference in any given sj can be obtained
by logarithmically differentiating [8’]
[14] [ ] Y-Y++= ssb ,jXjj Xcorrs j
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where a bar under a variable denotes logarithmic differences.26
Why using two different decompositions to analyse the inequality change? Our strategy is to take
the best of the two decompositions. On the one hand, Fields’ decomposition allows us to estimate
the effect of a given factor net of the influences of other variables, but the different components of
such effects are sometimes difficult to interpret. On the other hand, Jenkins’ decomposition does
not net out the effect of other factors on the contribution of a given factor, but overall inequality
change decomposes into very intuitive components. Thence, we use Fields’ decomposition to
account for inequality change and Jenkins’ decomposition to unravel what is going on within each
subgroup, that is, what explains those contributions.
Our empirical results reveal the relative importance of the effects of all socioeconomic
characteristics contained in the ECPFs on inequality. Generally speaking, these effects are small.
Our income generating model is
[15] Y = b0 + b1(Age) + b2(Age)2 + b3(Education Level) + b4(Sex) + b5(Civil Status) + b6(Partner
with income) + b7(Size of municipality) + b8(Socioeconomic classification) + b9(Household
size) + e
where individual characteristics refer to the household head. The explanatory power of all
characteristics in [15] is less than 50% of income inequality (45,3% in 1985 and 38,5% in 1996,
first two columns of Table 8). The individual characteristic which has a greater impact on income
inequality is the educational attainment of the household head. Nonetheless, the socioeconomic
classification of the household head and household composition also play an important rôle. Each
one of the remaining characteristics explains less than 5% of overall inequality. Finally, note that
age and sex have a small disequalizing effect.
According to the empirical evidence that derives from decomposition [12], the characteristics
included in [15] explain about two thirds (68.6%) of the change in income inequality between 1985
and 1996 —see Pj in the fifth column of Table 8. The variables that explain most of this changes
are exactly the same as those which have the greatest contribution to inequality at a point in time:
                                                                
26 Note that whenever any of the four contributions in [8’] has different signs for the two periods, the decomposition in [14] will no be
applicable for that variable. For instance, if coefficient b j has different signs in the regressions for t and t+1, the logarithmic difference
[log(bj,t+1/b j,t)] does no exist. Moreover, as Fields himself acknowledges, changes that occur in the real world are non-infinitesimal. The
decomposition in [14] could be approximated by using percentage changes. However, in practice the latter can result in a non-exact
decomposition, i.e. where all components are far from accounting for the entire change in sj —this has, indeed, been our case, and that
is why results are not shown. Another objection to the exact decomposition is that both the coefficients and the correlations are
functions of the covariance between the characteristics and income, so that the former cannot change without changes in the latter. A
way out is to assume that characteristics are orthogonal, but again, the resulting decomposition may no be exact.
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the socioeconomic classification, education level and household composition.
Notwithstanding this, in general, the overall inequality reduction witnessed between 1985 and 1996
is accounted for by reductions in within group inequalities (term T1 in decomposition [6], shown in
Table 7). To some extent, this finding challenges the traditional explanations of inequality changes
founded on changes in the age or education distribution, in household composition or in the
socioeconomic classification of the household head. This is not to say that those factors do not
account at all for the overall income inequality reduction experienced in Spain between 1985 and
1996 —as we shall show below, the ageing population, changes in the socioeconomic
classification or in the distribution by education level do have a certain impact on inequality
trends—, but separately, those contributions never explain more than a third of the overall change
—that is, the sum of terms T2, T3 and T4 is always smaller than a third.
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Table 5. Income inequality decomposition by population subgroups, 1985 and 1996. Decomposition
[5]
Component % I0
Partition Year I0 Within Between Within Between
Socioeconomic classification of the household head
1985 0.202 0.030 0.171 15.1 84.9
1996 0.148 0.016 0.132 10.5 89.5
Education level of the household head
1985 0.202 0.041 0.161 20.4 79.6
1996 0.148 0.026 0.122 17.4 82.6
Age of the household head
1985 0.202 0.003 0.199 1.6 98.4
1996 0.148 0.001 0.146 1.0 99.0
Cohort of the household head
1985 0.202 0.003 0.199 1.6 98.4
1996 0.146 0.001 0.146 0.5 99.5
Sex of the household head
1985 0.202 0.000 0.202 0.1 99.9
1996 0.148 0.000 0.147 0.2 99.8
Household size
1985 0.202 0.017 0.185 8.4 91.6
1996 0.148 0.008 0.139 5.5 94.5
Household composition
1985 0.202 0.021 0.181 10.4 89.6
1996 0.148 0.010 0.138 6.7 93.3
See [5] for the definition of within and between components. Partitions are defined in Appendix 3
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Table 6. Population shares, relative mean income and within group inequality, 1985 and 1996.
nk(ºnk/n) lk(ºmk/m) I0 mk
1985 1996 1985 1996 1985 1996 1985 1996
Socioeconomic classification of the household head
Unemployed 0.07 0.06 0.51 0.64 0.25 0.33 258,950 457,058
Entrepreneurs w/ dep. empl. 0.03 0.02 1.31 1.15 0.18 0.14 673,635 818,203
Agr. Entrepr. wo/ dep. empl. 0.05 0.03 0.68 0.76 0.28 0.16 349,672 542,215
Agricultural workers 0.03 0.02 0.64 0.77 0.15 0.13 326,902 548,846
Entrepreneurs wo/ dep. empl. 0.07 0.08 0.93 0.83 0.16 0.13 474,393 594,947
Other employees 0.33 0.33 1.26 1.21 0.15 0.13 646,009 865,287
Retired 0.30 0.39 0.93 0.95 0.14 0.10 474,551 677,367
Blue collar employees 0.09 0.07 0.97 0.89 0.25 0.13 494,703 633,356
Other non-active 0.03 0.01 0.89 0.77 0.24 0.16 456,247 547,421
Education level of the household head
Illiterate 0.04 0.03 0.67 0.74 0.16 0.10 342,189 524,448
Without studies 0.25 0.19 0.77 0.83 0.15 0.10 395,888 593,420
Primary education (1st cycle) 0.48 0.41 0.90 0.90 0.17 0.11 461,807 638,242
Primary education (2nd cycle) 0.08 0.15 1.29 0.96 0.17 0.13 660,773 681,806
Secondary education 0.06 0.14 1.41 1.23 0.12 0.17 722,904 876,807
Short BA & BSc. 0.05 0.04 1.62 1.57 0.12 0.12 828,729 1,122,794
BA, BSc. & Doctors 0.04 0.04 2.18 1.91 0.15 0.14 1,118,301 1,358,608
Age of the household head
<25 0.02 0.02 0.91 0.80 0.26 0.18 466,699 567,408
26-35 0.15 0.13 1.17 1.11 0.21 0.21 601,281 791,376
36-45 0.21 0.20 0.99 0.99 0.26 0.16 508,427 703,496
46-55 0.23 0.20 0.94 1.03 0.20 0.17 479,928 734,905
56-65 0.20 0.20 1.03 0.96 0.21 0.13 525,561 685,342
>65 0.19 0.26 0.93 0.97 0.10 0.10 475,559 693,821
Cohort of the household head
>=1960 0.02 0.16 0.91 1.08 0.26 0.20 466,699 774,315
1950-59 0.15 0.20 1.17 0.99 0.21 0.17 601,281 711,584
1940-49 0.21 0.20 0.99 1.01 0.26 0.17 508,427 725,763
1930-39 0.23 0.21 0.94 0.98 0.20 0.13 479,928 698,213
1920-29 0.20 0.17 1.03 0.96 0.21 0.09 525,561 687,308
<1920 0.19 0.08 0.93 0.96 0.10 0.09 475,559 684,949
Sex of the household head
Male 0.86 0.79 0.99 0.99 0.20 0.15 509,354 704,556
Female 0.14 0.21 1.04 1.04 0.20 0.14 531,262 744,568
Household size
1 Member 0.08 0.11 1.29 1.17 0.24 0.15 662,331 835,604
2 Members 0.21 0.24 1.12 1.08 0.19 0.13 571,937 772,001
3 Members 0.19 0.22 1.07 1.04 0.14 0.14 549,189 744,195
4 Members 0.24 0.26 1.04 0.95 0.20 0.12 534,014 675,673
5 Members 0.15 0.11 0.83 0.85 0.16 0.18 424,902 608,225
6+ Members 0.13 0.06 0.66 0.68 0.22 0.14 340,717 485,347
Household composition
1 adult 0.04 0.04 1.65 1.40 0.32 0.23 845,988 996,779
2 adults 0.11 0.12 1.26 1.19 0.21 0.15 647,801 847,366
3+ adults 0.22 0.27 1.01 1.01 0.17 0.14 516,515 717,649
1 adult + child 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.95 0.63 0.29 492,961 674,687
2 adults + 1 child 0.07 0.07 1.19 1.05 0.15 0.18 607,458 750,600
2 adults + 2 children 0.11 0.08 1.08 0.93 0.19 0.15 553,134 666,513
2 adults + 3+ children 0.06 0.02 0.83 0.63 0.26 0.13 426,568 446,544
3+ adults + children 0.20 0.13 0.73 0.80 0.19 0.14 372,327 569,642
1 adult, HH>65 years 0.04 0.07 0.94 1.02 0.08 0.07 483,746 727,639
2+ adults, HH>65 years 0.15 0.19 0.92 0.96 0.11 0.11 473,334 682,001
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Table 7. Subgroup decomposition [6] of the changes in overall income inequality, 1985 and 1996.
Percentages
Partition T1 T2 T3 T4
Socioeconomic classification 58.9 13.7 7.2 20.8
Education 75.3 -3.8 -5.6 30.8
Age 84.6 12.3 0.4 2.9
Cohort 127.2 -31.6 -1.0 3.2
Sex 100.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.2
Household size 81.2 2.4 8.3 7.8
Household composition 70.4 9.3 6.5 15.3
Terms T1, T2, T3 and T4 are defined in [6] and in the main text. T1 is the contribution resulting from changes in
inequality within subgroups. T2 and T3 correspond to the contribution resulting from changes in subgroup population
shares. T4 is the contribution resulting from changes in subgroup mean incomes. Partitions are defined in Appendix 3.
Next we use the three decompositions defined above to analyse the contribution of every
characteristic to inequality level at a point in time and its change between 1985 and 1996.
a) SOCIOECONOMIC CLASIFICATION OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD
As we have pointed out above, the social classification of the household head is the factor that
most contributes to the change in income inequality —term T1 in table 7 is about 60% and Pj, in
Table 8, is 25%. In the decomposition [6] the remaining 40% (T2+T3+T4) is accounted for by
changes in subgroup’s population shares (T2+T3) and changes in subgroup’s mean incomes (T4),
in the same proportion. These changes imply a change in the correlation between the
socioeconomic classification and income that explains the change in the contribution of this
variable to the change in income inequality —see Table 8. The most notorious change in the
subgroup’s population shares is closely related to the ageing of the population: the retired increase
their relative share by 9 points —see Table 6. This change in the retired’s share reinforces the
equalising impact that the substantial fall in this subgroup’s income inequality has on overall
inequality change.
As the between component in Table 5 shows inequality among relative income means also fell.
Notwithstanding this, not all groups having mean income below the sample mean, increase their
relative mean. The relative mean incomes of the only two subgroups having mean incomes above
the sample mean (‘entrepreneurs with dependent employees’ and ‘other employees’) fall. Indeed,
several groups experience a substantial fall in their relative mean incomes. The ‘entrepreneurs
without dependent employees’ see their mean income reduced 10 points, whereas that of the ‘blue
collar workers’ and of the ‘other workers’ gets reduced 8 points. It is also worth noting the 13 points
increase in the relative mean income of the ‘unemployed’. The ‘retired’, however, benefit from a
slight increase in their relative income mean. Such a small increase is, nonetheless, insufficient to
push their mean income above the sample mean.
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Table 8. Contribution of the socioeconomic characteristics to overall income inequality and its
change, 1985 and 1996. (Decompositions [8], [11], [12], [14]).
s j % R2 P j Decomposition of the change in sj (%)
Variable 1985 1996 1985 1996 A B C D
Age -0.5 -0.2 -1.1 -0.4 -1.5 2.6 -3.7 108.5 7.4
Education 15.7 13.2 34.6 34.3 24.1 116.5 30.3 9.2 56.0
Sex -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 -1.0 -0.4 1365.1 -412.3 -539.6 313.2
Civil status 2.2 1.4 4.9 3.7 5.0 83.6 -22.5 65.2 26.4
Spouse with income 4.4 4.4 9.8 11.4 4.5 2382.0 -2730.9 2308.2 1859.2
Size of Municipality 2.5 2.9 5.6 7.4 1.3 256.4 4.6 -434.0 -273.0
Socioeconomic classification 12.9 9.4 28.5 24.4 25.0 -3.1 4.8 106.3 7.9
Household composition 8.4 7.7 18.5 20.1 10.5 15.9 81.4 13.3 10.5
R2 45.3 38.5 100.0 100.0 68.6
No. Observations 3034 3067
s j is the contribution of variable j to income inequality at a point in time (see [8]).
% R2 is the contribution of variable j to the change in income inequality as a percentage of the explanatory power of the model: 100[s j
/R2].
P j  is the contribution of variable j to the change in income inequality (see [12]).
Decomposition of the change in sj (expressed as % s j):
A: Relative change of the coefficient.
B: Relative change of the standard deviation of the variable.
C: Relative change of the correlation between the variable and the logarithm of income.
D: Relative change of the standard deviation of the logarithm of income.
Variables are defined in Appendix 3.
Inequality fell for all socioeconomic groups, with the notable exception of the unemployed. The
reduction, though, is not the same for all groups. In general, groups with lower mean income
experience a greater reduction in within inequality —note the substantial fall of the ‘agricultural
entrepreneurs with dependent employees’, the ‘blue collar workers’ and the ‘other non active’. The
most notable exception is the ‘unemployed’ group, for which inequality increases drastically. What
is driving such and increase? Although the answer to this question is clearly beyond the scope of
this paper, some tentative explanations could include a change in the benefits policy, a change in
the composition of the unemployed subgroup, or a change in the income distribution of the
unemployed in the employment spell previous to the interview.
b) EDUCATION LEVEL OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD
The change in population shares by education level has a disequalizing effect of about 10% of the
overall inequality change —see T2+T3 in Table 7. Such an equalizing effect is mainly due to the
decreasing proportion of households whose head has primary education (1st cycle) or less.
Changes in subgroup’s relative mean income, however are equalizing —term T4 in Table 7.
Overall, relative mean incomes increased for households whose head attained lower education
levels (having also smaller relative mean incomes) and fell for those headed by individuals with
higher educational attainments. In terms of the decomposition in [14] this implied a reduction in the
education coefficient.27
                                                                
27 It is worth noting that those coefficients are not returns to education estimates. Actually, according to Barceinas et al. (2000),
returns to education increased for more educated individuals. Thence, changes in the distribution of income sources other than
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The fall in within group inequality, which accounts for three fourths of overall inequality reduction, is
mainly experienced by households headed by individuals with low educational attainments (less
than secondary education). In fact, within group inequality only rises for households headed by
individuals with secondary education —this is also the group with the highest subgroup population
share increase. Changes in within group inequality follow a clear pattern. In 1985 within group
inequality was lower the more educated groups than for less educated ones. Twelve years later,
the situation is the opposite. In sum, during these twelve years, more educated group’s income fell
in relative terms, but its dispersion rose, whereas the less educated group’s relative income and
dispersion behaved the opposite way.
c) HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION
Changes in household composition account for 10.5% of overall income inequality change, and
this percentage rises to 70.4 if the effect of the other variables are not taken into account. On the
one hand, these changes in household composition are due to a greater equality of subgroup’s
mean incomes: relative mean income falls (increases) for those groups having mean incomes
above (below) the sample mean. On the other hand, those changes point at certain changes in the
population shares of the more numerous households and those with and individual aged 65 or
more, which reduces the dispersion of this variable. Within group inequality falls for all groups,
except for those with two adults and a child. Finally, we would like to comment on the lone parent
households group. Even though its population share is still very small, and has hardly changed
over the period, and its mean income is only 5 points below the sample mean, its inequality fell
drastically. Notwithstanding all this, in 1996, lone parent households still showed the highest
income inequality.
d) AGE OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD
The sign of the effect of age on the overall inequality change differs according to the
decomposition used. When the joint effect of all variables is taken into account —decomposition
[14]— age has a small disequalizing impact. However, when considering the sole effect of age —
decomposition in [6]—, the impact is equalizing. The small disequalizing effect is accounted for by
the falling (negative) correlation between age and income. Note also that the increasing dispersion
of the age variable has prevented the negative effect from being greater. Indeed, the main change
in population shares is an increase of the ‘older than 65’ group’s share. It is also worth noting the
substantial fall in relative mean income of the youngest group, which has a small effect on overall
inequality change because its population share is very small (2%) and it does not change over the
period.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
labour income should explain the decreasing education coefficients observed in decomposition [14].
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e) BIRTH COHORT OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD
The breakdown by cohorts allow us to analyse the life-cycle effects on the overall inequality
change.28 If nothing else would have changed, falling within group inequality would imply a
reduction in overall inequality 30% bigger than the finally observed. Even though inequality falls for
all cohorts, those reductions are specially significant for the last three cohorts still in working age in
1985 —1940-49, 1930-39 and 1920-29. The inequality reduction in the last cohort is likely to be
due to the transition from labour income to pensions for its members were 56 to 65 years old in
1985 and retired 12 years later. Changes in subgroup population shares have a clear-cut
disequalizing effect. This change is mainly due to the relative increase for the youngest cohort
(having the greatest within group inequality in both years) and to the relative fall for the oldest one
(having the smallest within inequality, also in both years).
f) SEX OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD
Surprisingly enough, sex does not account neither for inequality level at a point in time nor for the
change in inequality. In other words, income inequality is the same among households headed by
males than among those headed by females.29
5. Robustness analyses to changes in the equivalence scale, in the income definition and to
trimming
This section shows the robustness of our main results to changes in the equivalence scale (section
5.1), in the income definition (section 5.2), and with respect to the quality of the micro-data set we
use (section 5.3).
5.1. Equivalence scales and changes in inequality trends
As explained above, the analysis so far employed the OECD equivalence scale to equivalise
money income. This assumes certain needs of and relationships within households which may be
driving our results. The main aim of this section is to show to what extent the income inequality
trends obtained (in section 3) employing income adjusted using the OECD equivalence scale hold
when using different equivalence scales.
                                                                
28 Strictly speaking, the analysis of cohort effects requires panel data for this is the only way to follow the same individuals over time.
Notwithstanding this, since ECPF samples are representative for each sample year, within cohort income changes can be assumed to
be due to life-cycle effects. However, note that, the cross-section nature of our data does not permit to distinguish life-cycle effects from
time effects.
29 These results call for further investigation on the identification of the female headed household since it does not seem
reasonable to assume that relative mean income is higher for female than for men headed households.
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In order to do so, we use the parametric equivalence scale put forth by Cutler and Katz (1992), CK,
and the inequality measure I0. CK can be written as
( )baMACK += 0 £ a £ 1, 0 £ b £ 1
where A is the number of adults, M the number of children aged less than 14, a determines the
importance of children and b is the equivalizing parameter. b = 0 would correspond to not
equivalizing (i.e. equivalent income equals household income); for b > 0, economies of scale are
assumed, which reduce as b is increased; and therefore, for b = 1 equivalent income is per capita
income (that is, assuming a = 1). The OECD equivalence scale corresponds to values of a = 0.69
and b = 0.82, for the study period. These values are very similar to those obtained in Duclos and
Mercader-Prats (1999) using the EPF 1980/81 (a = 0.72 y b = 0.82).30 As Figure 6 shows,
inequality (I0) and the two parameters a and b have a U-shape relationship, and this is more
pronounced for parameter b.
Figure 6. Inequality (I0) of real net equivalent income for different values of a and b, 1996.
The impact of the equivalizing parameter (b) on income inequality depends on two factors, which
may go in opposite directions. On the one hand, given the positive correlation between monetary
income (not equivalized) and household size, increasing b means that equivalent income for
households above average size is likely to fall by more than equivalent income for households
below average size, as long as b is sufficiently small. Hence, this is an equalizing effect. On the
other hand, the same process may change rankings in the equivalent income distribution, and this
may work in the opposite direction. The joint density of monetary income (b = 0) and household
                                                                
30 Parameters a and b were estimated adjusting CK to the OECD equivalence scale, in a non-linear manner. Duclos and
Mercader-Prats (1999) use the same procedure to estimate the two parameters using the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares
1980/1981.
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size corroborates the positive relation between these two variables —see Figure 7.31
Figure 7. Joint density of monetary income and household size, 1996.
However the joint density of per capita income (b = 1) and household size clearly shows a negative
relationship between these two variables. This is explained by the reranking in the income
distribution pointed out above.
For I0, the effect of small changes in b on inequality depends on the covariance between equivalent
income (y) and household size, nh:
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )hhh nbx
nx
y
ny
b
I
logvar
log,covlog,cov0 -»-=
¶
¶
where y  is average equivalent income, x is household monetary income and x  is average
monetary income.
                                                                
31 Joint densities for other sample years are very similar to the one for 1996 and are not shown.
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Figure 8. Joint density of per capita income and household size, 1996.
Given the positive correlation between monetary income and household size on would expect a
positive correlation between equivalent income and household size for values of b close to zero,
and a negative correlation for values of b close to one. Table 9 shows that, indeed, the covariance
between equivalent income and household size is positive for values of b smaller than 0.6 and
negative for values of b greater than that.
Table 9. Covariance between equivalent income and household size for different values of the
parameter b (for a=1), and correlation between monetary income and household size, 1985-1996
( )( )[ ]yny hlog,cov Corr(x, nh)
value of parameter b
Year 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1985 0,11 0,09 0,07 0,04 0,02 -0,01 -0,03 -0,06 -0,09 -0,11 -0,14 0,22
1986 0,13 0,10 0,08 0,06 0,03 0,01 -0,02 -0,04 -0,07 -0,10 -0,13 0,33
1987 0,13 0,11 0,09 0,07 0,05 0,03 0,00 -0,02 -0,04 -0,07 -0,10 0,34
1988 0,12 0,10 0,08 0,06 0,04 0,02 -0,01 -0,03 -0,06 -0,08 -0,11 0,36
1989 0,14 0,12 0,09 0,07 0,05 0,03 0,00 -0,02 -0,05 -0,07 -0,10 0,36
1990 0,14 0,12 0,10 0,08 0,06 0,03 0,01 -0,01 -0,04 -0,06 -0,09 0,33
1991 0,14 0,11 0,09 0,07 0,05 0,02 0,00 -0,03 -0,06 -0,08 -0,11 0,38
1992 0,14 0,11 0,09 0,07 0,05 0,02 0,00 -0,03 -0,05 -0,08 -0,11 0,41
1993 0,13 0,11 0,09 0,06 0,04 0,02 -0,01 -0,03 -0,06 -0,09 -0,12 0,38
1994 0,12 0,10 0,08 0,05 0,03 0,01 -0,02 -0,04 -0,07 -0,10 -0,12 0,34
1995 0,11 0,09 0,07 0,05 0,03 0,00 -0,02 -0,05 -0,08 -0,10 -0,13 0,33
1996 0,13 0,11 0,09 0,07 0,04 0,02 -0,01 -0,03 -0,06 -0,08 -0,11 0,35
Moreover, due to the equalizing and disequalizing effects mentioned above, when the
equivalisation parameter increases, inequality changes more rapidly for the more equal
distribution, that is, for 1996 —see Figure 9, where I0 is normalized to 0 for b = 0 in both years.
Therefore, when going from family to per capita income, the observed inequality fall between 1985
and 1996 increases monotonically.
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Figure 9. measure I0 for different values of b and a=1, 1985 and 1996.
(I0 normalized to 0 for b=0)
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5.2. Changes in the income definition
As the Spanish literature shows,32 trends in income inequality differ according to the income
definition employed. This literature uses 3 definitions of income: adjusted income, expenditure and
monetary income (before and after tax). At the same time, expenditure adjusted for actual and
imputed rents has been also employed as a proxy for permanent income. In accordance with this
practice, next we show how trends in income inequality change for the six definitions shown in
Table 11.
Table 10. Different definitions of income
[1] Net income monetary income + non-monetary income
[2] Before tax income [1] + income tax (IRPF)
[3] Gross income [2] + social security contributions
[4] Expenditure total expenditure
[5] Adjusted expenditure expenditure adjusted for actual and imputed rents,
self-consumption and in kind payments
[6] Income adjusted to
National Accounts monetary and non-monetary income, adjusted to National Accounts
The main conclusion of this robustness analysis is that inequality not only falls for the period 1985-
1996 regardless of the income definition employed, but its trend is also similar over the whole
period —see Figure 10. As expected, inequality is greatest for gross income and smallest for net
income. Before tax income inequality is smaller but its trend parallels that of gross income —
                                                                
32 See the references cited in section 3.
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implying a nearly constant (negative) relative redistributive effect (RRE)33 of social security
contributions over the period. The RRE of the direct tax is greater for the second half of the
Eighties (about 20%) than for the first half of the Nineties (about 18%), and it is specially important
in 1990, for which EER is maximum.34
Expenditure inequality is slightly greater to net income inequality,35 and adjusted income inequality
is greater than expenditure inequality. That is, the distribution of rents (actual and imputed) has a
clear disequalizing effect. Finally, inequality of income adjusted to the National accounts lies
between that of net and gross income, and follows a distinct trend.
Table 11. Inequality of 6 definitions of income (equivalent, OCDE), 1985-1996.
Year NI GI BTI Expenditure Adj. Expenditure Adjusted to NA RRE
I0
1985 0.202 0.277 0.251 0.184 0.205 0.226 19.5
1986 0.178 0.251 0.223 0.185 0.214 0.203 20.0
1987 0.165 0.234 0.211 0.174 0.203 0.196 21.8
1988 0.162 0.227 0.205 0.172 0.202 0.187 20.9
1989 0.154 0.219 0.195 0.173 0.198 0.180 21.1
1990 0.153 0.226 0.201 0.169 0.197 0.216 23.6
1991 0.156 0.216 0.193 0.172 0.199 0.207 19.0
1992 0.148 0.210 0.179 0.164 0.192 0.189 17.1
1993 0.150 0.216 0.183 0.162 0.191 0.193 17.9
1994 0.156 0.218 0.189 0.164 0.193 0.197 17.8
1995 0.148 0.210 0.184 0.167 0.201 0.210 19.5
1996 0.148 0.211 0.182 0.153 0.188 0.185 18.9
Gini
1985 0.331 0.392 0.372 0.330 0.346 0.360 10.9
1986 0.309 0.372 0.349 0.331 0.352 0.343 11.6
1987 0.298 0.360 0.340 0.322 0.345 0.337 12.5
1988 0.291 0.351 0.331 0.322 0.344 0.330 12.1
1989 0.291 0.353 0.334 0.322 0.342 0.325 12.6
1990 0.293 0.359 0.339 0.318 0.341 0.355 13.7
1991 0.294 0.349 0.329 0.322 0.343 0.347 10.7
1992 0.282 0.340 0.316 0.316 0.338 0.335 10.9
1993 0.291 0.352 0.326 0.313 0.336 0.340 10.8
1994 0.292 0.352 0.325 0.313 0.336 0.342 10.1
1995 0.293 0.351 0.328 0.317 0.344 0.353 10.5
1996 0.289 0.348 0.323 0.305 0.333 0.332 10.4
NI: Net income; GI: Gross income; BTI: Before tax income; E: Expenditure; AE: Adjusted Expenditure; IANA: Income adjusted to National accounts;
RRE: Relative redistributive effect = 100[(BTI-NI)/BTI].
Note: see table 10 for the exact definitions of the 6 income variables.
                                                                
33 Relative redistributive effect (RRE), is defined as the percentage change of the redistributive effect according to the inequality
measure I0  —the results for the Gini coefficient are very similar.
34 This maximum is surely related to the reform in the income tax implemented in 1989, which allowed individuals to file
separately. Lambert and Ramos (1997) obtain the same evidence for the period 1985-1991 using the panel of tax files, and
attribute such improvement to a fall in horizontal inequity.
35 Actually, the correlation between net income and expenditure is positive and high —see Figure 11 in Appendix 2. Since joint
densities for other years are very similar, they are not shown.
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Figure 10. I0 for 6 definitions of income (equivalent, OCDE). 1985-1996.
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5.3. Robustness to trimming
One of the problems that arise when working with survey micro data concerns the quality of the
data: these may be misreported, miscoded, or just missing. Obviously, poor quality data may lead
to misleading conclusions if the observed income distribution differs substantially form the true and
unobserved one. Even, when dealing with relatively big samples, one or two anomalous
observations may hamper or drive the estimation of inequality measures and other distributional
tools such as the Lorenz curve.36
The aim of this section is to check the robustness of our main conclusions to dirty data. Following
Cowell and Victoria-Feser’s suggestions we strategically trim the income distribution and
implement dominance criteria to the modified distributions.
Data imperfections could be modelled using data contamination models (Cowell, 1998).37 These
models assume that the observed distribution is a mixture of two distributions: the true and an
‘alien’ contamination distribution. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient information to model
such data imperfections. Instead we compare dominance results from strategically trimmed
                                                                
36 See Cowell and Victoria-Feser (1996, 1998) for analyses of the robustness of several distributional tools usually employed to
assess income distributions.
37 To model certain types of data contamination, such as the systematic income misreporting of well-identified groups (e.g. self-
employed), error measurement models are thought to be the most appropriate ones.
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distributions. Given that dominance outcomes are more likely to be affected if random ‘spots’ of
contamination occur in either tail of the distribution (Cowell et al., 1999), we compare dominance
outcomes under 1% and 5% ‘balanced’ and ‘unbalanced’ trims. A ‘balanced’ trim removes a small
percentage (q) of observations from each tail of the distribution (that is, removes a 2q percentage
of the sample), whereas ‘unbalanced’ trims remove a small percentage (q) from only one tail.
Table 12 shows the results of the trimming in terms of Lorenz and generalized Lorenz dominance
for three equivalent scales: OECD’s (i.e. a = 0.69 and b = 0.82 in CK), household income (i.e. b =
0), and per capita income (i.e. a = 1 and b = 1). In general, the Lorenz dominance conclusion of the
1996 income distribution on the 1985’s is robust to all trims and for the three equivalence scales.
Moreover, both Lorenz and generalized Lorenz dominance outcomes are also quite robust when
dividing the whole period in 4 sub-periods that replicate the phases of the Spanish economic cycle.
Table 12. Effect of trimming on Lorenz and generalized Lorenz dominance, 1985-1996.
Equivalent Income (OCDE) household Income Per Capita Income
Period NT BT UU UL NT BT UU UL NT BT UU UL
Lorenz dominance
1% Trimming
1985-1996 D = = = D = = = D = = =
1985-1989 D = = = D = = = D = = =
1989-1991 Ca1 = = = Ca2 Ca5 Ca4 = Ca1 d Ca1 =
1991-1994 Cb1 Ca2 Ca2 = Cb1 = D = Cd4 = Ca5 =
1994-1996 Cb1 = = = Ca1 d d = Ca1 = = =
5% Trimming
1985-1996 D = = = D = = = D = = =
1985-1989 D = = = D Ca1 Ca2 = D = = =
1989-1991 Ca1 d d = Ca2 Cb3 Ca1 = Ca1 d d =
1991-1994 Cb1 D D = Cb1 D D = Cd4 Ca5 Ca3 Ca3
1994-1996 Ca1 = = = Ca1 = = D Ca1 = = =
Generalized Lorenz dominance
1% Trimming
1985-1996 D = = = D = = = D = = =
1985-1989 D = = = D = = = D = = =
1989-1991 D = = = D = = = D = = =
1991-1994 D = = = Cb1 D D = D = = =
1994-1996 D = = = D = Ca4 = D = = =
5% Trimming
1985-1996 D = = = D = = = D = = =
1985-1989 D = = = D = = = D = = =
1989-1991 D = = = D = = = D = = =
1991-1994 D = = = Cb1 D D = D = = =
1994-1996 D = = = D Cb1 Cb1 Ca2 D = = =
NT: No trimming; BT: Balanced trim; UU: Upper tail Unbalanced trim; UL: Lower tail Unbalanced trim. D: Dominance of the final year of the period’s curve
over that of the first one. d: Dominance of the first year of the period’s curve over that of the final one. Cb#: the final of year period’s curve crosses from
below that of the first one # times. Ca#: the final of year period’s curve crosses from above that of the first one # times. =: same result as that for the whole
untrimmed sample.
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6.Conclusion
In this paper we analyse the Spanish income distribution for the period 1985-1996 using data from
the ECPF and a wide range of visual and analytical techniques. Our results corroborate the
existing evidence on falling income inequality for the second half of the Eighties and show that this
trend extends over the first half of the Nineties. Moreover, we also find that this trend is robust to
changes in the equivalence scale, to changes in the income distribution and to data contamination.
Taking advantage of the socioeconomic information contained in our data set, we also study some
of the causes which may be explaining the overall picture of income inequality and its change over
this period by means of three decomposition analyses. Three main responsible factors clearly
stand out: the socioeconomic situation and education attainment of the household head, and
household composition.
Those trends and the factors accounting for them raise important policy issues to be tackled in
further investigations. In particular our analysis by population subgroups identifies several key
subgroups such as the lower educated, the retired or the lone parents, and which denote the
importance of the demographic change our economy is experiencing. The link between the
distribution of labour income and the distribution of total income is also specially important if we
want to understand the impact of certain changes such as the increasing number of temporary
contracts, the growing female participation rates, technical change, the growing terciarization of the
economy or the increasing proportion of public sector contracts.
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Appendix 1. Components of the real net household income
Our definition of net income is:
1. Net:
+ Monetary net income labour net income
self-employment net income
capital net income
net pensions
net unemployment benefits
other net benefits
other monetary net income
+ Non-monetary net income labour non-monetary income
self-employment non-monetary income
imputed rents for house ownership38
other non-monetary income
- SS Contributions Social Security contributions paid by the employees
Social Security contributions paid by the employer
Social security contributions paid by the self-employed
Contributions for unemployment paid by the employees to Social Security
- Direct taxes Tax withheld on salary to employees
Tax withheld on salary to self-employed
Tax withheld on capital
Balance of tax payable (refundable)
2. Real. As pointed out above, we deflated nominal income by using a retail price index for each income decile. These
income decile RPI was estimated using the household expenditure structure given in the ECPFs. Income is expressed in
1985 prices.
3. Equivalent: in accordance with the inequality and welfare literature we use the OECD equivalent scale. This way
income becomes a better indicator of living standard.
4. Household: the unit of analysis is the household. Therefore, and consistent to our previous considerations, each
household is assigned its real net equivalent income. It would be interesting to analyse to what extent our results would
change if we assigned the household equivalent income to each individual.39
                                                                
38 We have imputed the rents of households living in their own house. See Oliver (1997) for further details on the imputation
procedure.
39 For an example of this practice, see Jenkins (1995).
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Appendix 2. Income distribution, 1985-1996
Table 13. Real net equivalent income by vingtiles, 1985-1996.
In 1985 prices
percentile 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
5 146,554 161,992 186,504 203,246 232,946 246,476 242,543 272,888 259,798 256,955 253,152 253,081
10 201,158 218,052 240,201 254,084 280,266 292,627 305,068 333,640 327,775 321,481 320,160 323,643
15 241,375 252,299 276,742 290,816 318,576 331,721 346,492 371,116 372,189 370,944 367,201 370,954
20 274,325 281,162 301,161 319,768 350,082 367,102 381,623 404,610 407,801 406,538 405,892 412,741
25 298,259 308,179 327,985 355,179 376,985 398,651 415,230 437,876 442,158 436,776 448,389 450,748
30 320,312 331,728 355,224 385,196 405,393 425,961 444,428 471,265 478,289 471,183 483,161 483,943
35 347,501 357,628 380,942 415,146 430,971 460,011 477,371 501,051 508,386 502,315 513,883 519,887
40 373,471 385,213 407,322 439,206 460,021 494,702 504,124 535,166 538,033 535,332 544,611 552,406
45 401,073 409,529 433,190 466,603 488,546 519,711 536,252 564,197 568,951 569,418 580,467 589,610
50 426,761 438,177 459,082 496,176 517,107 551,248 568,065 602,763 604,957 599,983 612,725 622,508
55 458,819 463,830 489,411 528,377 549,869 585,463 608,561 634,626 636,175 633,933 649,124 661,161
60 494,893 493,910 518,390 558,730 584,445 618,339 642,276 666,867 681,168 676,543 691,362 708,116
65 527,935 525,242 554,604 597,146 625,415 654,804 689,386 710,588 723,904 724,665 737,826 745,176
70 569,801 566,880 601,111 632,444 665,835 698,936 731,458 760,951 781,215 776,244 790,120 800,896
75 618,726 620,392 643,909 682,336 712,844 754,005 794,163 820,663 844,399 835,392 853,986 862,890
80 685,454 679,815 699,575 747,410 777,698 825,195 868,710 895,895 932,343 913,194 924,283 944,129
85 761,317 763,403 776,745 822,931 857,755 915,266 970,990 991,863 1,021,353 1,015,144 1,024,853 1,051,374
90 889,607 887,312 892,214 938,574 980,832 1,039,265 1,118,375 1,147,413 1,182,496 1,155,487 1,186,191 1,184,574
95 1,111,840 1,107,687 1,085,300 1,128,940 1,222,284 1,308,198 1,370,938 1,391,527 1,502,338 1,433,845 1,466,947 1,461,742
Mean 512,512 508,327 531,715 565,340 602,146 637,448 661,551 688,494 703,228 698,005 710,191 712,934
Table 14. Cumulative real net equivalent income, 1985-1996. (Generalized Lorenz curves co-ordinates)
In percentage
Percentile 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
5 4,041 6,505 5,978 7,128 6,020 6,112 7,838 9,056 9,615 7,944 8,104 9,485
10 12,607 15,984 16,056 17,912 16,894 17,928 20,548 22,309 22,584 21,185 21,384 23,486
15 23,112 27,321 28,354 31,255 30,680 32,596 35,800 38,655 38,460 37,295 37,592 40,197
20 35,396 39,774 42,360 46,609 46,797 49,301 53,170 57,209 56,795 55,611 56,275 59,618
25 49,134 53,899 57,732 63,425 64,855 68,451 72,235 77,751 77,366 76,134 77,209 80,846
30 64,488 69,326 74,983 81,886 84,662 89,231 93,418 100,060 99,950 98,643 100,170 103,880
35 81,297 86,425 93,430 101,809 106,215 111,844 116,296 124,799 124,546 123,138 125,156 128,721
40 99,561 105,011 113,414 123,011 129,128 136,290 141,292 151,084 150,931 149,620 152,168 155,594
45 119,279 124,898 134,765 145,859 153,983 162,367 167,983 179,578 179,329 177,867 180,981 184,500
50 140,614 146,458 157,482 170,352 180,197 190,481 196,792 209,839 209,739 208,320 211,819 215,213
55 163,564 169,504 181,565 196,489 208,353 220,428 227,507 242,309 242,608 240,760 244,909 247,957
60 188,131 194,224 207,699 223,906 238,062 252,209 260,129 276,767 277,713 275,186 279,799 282,961
65 214,476 220,802 235,369 253,334 269,907 285,823 294,870 313,434 315,055 312,260 317,166 319,996
70 242,922 248,867 264,918 284,407 303,889 321,678 332,152 352,088 355,080 351,761 357,234 359,516
75 273,792 279,162 296,859 318,038 340,394 359,978 371,977 393,615 397,564 393,690 399,778 401,971
80 307,249 312,059 331,190 354,046 379,618 401,130 415,190 438,233 443,402 438,929 445,923 447,588
85 344,261 348,116 368,597 393,161 422,531 446,356 461,793 486,607 493,042 488,361 495,670 497,270
90 385,960 388,448 410,614 437,028 470,105 496,472 513,480 540,281 547,824 543,089 550,595 552,597
95 434,124 435,284 458,781 488,573 524,669 554,533 573,005 601,908 610,880 605,320 615,199 616,732
100 512,512 508,327 531,715 565,340 602,146 637,448 661,551 688,494 703,228 698,005 710,191 712,934
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Table 15. Lorenz and generalized Loren dominance for three definitions of income,
(equivalent, OECD)
Period NI GI Expenditure Period NI GI Expenditure
Lorenz dominance Generalized Lorenz dominance
1985-1996 D = = 1985-1996 D = =
1985-1989 D = = 1985-1989 D = =
1989-1991 Ca1 = Ca2 1989-1991 D = =
1991-1994 Cb1 = D 1991-1994 D = =
1994-1996 Ca1 = D 1994-1996 D = Ca1
NI: Net income;  GI: Gross income;
D: Dominance of the final year of the period’s curve over that of the first one. Cb#: the final of year period’s curve
crosses from below that of the first one # times. Ca#: the final of year period’s curve crosses from above that of the first
one # times. =: same result as that for the whole untrimmed sample.
Figure 11. Joint density of net equivalent income and equivalent expenditure, 1996
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Appendix 3. Definition of the variables used in the decomposition analyses of section
4
Variable Description
Socioeconomic classification Unemployed
(of the household head) Entrepreneurs with dependent employees
Agricultural entrepreneurs without dependent employees
Agricultural workers
Entrepreneurs without dependent employees
Other employees
Retired and pensioners
Blue collar employees
Other non-active
Education Level Illiterate
(of the household head) Without studies
Primary education (1st cycle)
Primary education (2  nd cycle)
Secondary education
Short BA & BSc.
BA, BSc. & Doctors
Age groups <25
(of the household head) 26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
>65
Cohort >=1960
(of the household head) 1950-59
1940-49
1930-39
1920-29
<1920
Sex Male
(of the household head) Female
Household size 1 Member
2 Members
3 Members
4 Members
5 Members
6+ Members
Household composition 1 adult
2 adults
3+ adults
1 adult + children
2 adults + 1 child
2 adults + 2 children
2 adults + 3+ children
3+ adults + children
1 adult, HH head>65 years
2+ adults, HH head>65 years
Civil status Married
(of the household head) Not married
Partner with salary Partner with salary
Partner without salary
Size of Municipality < 10,000 inhabitants
Between 10,000 - 50,000 inhab. (except capitals of
provinces)
> 50,000 inhab., and capitals of provinces
Madrid and Barcelona
